Bundesbank Gold Revalued – Otherwise Negative Equity? Sell Bundesbank Gold Now?
May 25, 2026
When the Bundesbank's gold is discussed in Germany, it is rarely about accounting. And yet, that is exactly the core: In the 2025 balance sheet, the Bundesbank's gold position has risen to 395 billion euros due to valuation – a historic high.
At the same time, the Bundesbank is reporting a loss again for 2025: The annual deficit amounts to 8.6 billion euros; the accumulated loss thus totals 27.8 billion euros.
This leads to a question that is currently being asked much more frequently than before: What does it mean for stability and confidence when a central bank records losses – and why does gold of all things play such a major role in this?
The term „revalued“ sounds like a political decision. In fact, at the Bundesbank, it primarily describes a balance sheet logic: gold is valued at the market price on the reporting date, and the change in value does not end up in the profit and loss account, but in a separate item: the revaluation reserve.
For gold, this reserve stands at 387 billion euros at the end of 2025.
The total revaluation account (gold, foreign currencies, securities) amounts to 388 billion euros.
This magnitude explains why „gold on the balance sheet“ today is not just a debate about reserves, but a balance sheet issue.
The Bundesbank cites net equity of 363 billion euros as a key figure.
What is important here is what is included in this figure: in addition to capital and reserves, it explicitly includes the revaluation account as well as the accumulated loss.
The effect is clear: The sharply increased gold revaluation reserve overcompensates for the loss phase in the balance sheet. Without this valuation block, the „visual“ stability of the balance sheet would be significantly lower – and that is exactly why it is misleading to treat gold as an arbitrarily disposable „financial cushion“ for other purposes.
As stabilizing as the revaluation may be: The Bundesbank explicitly points out that revaluation reserves reflect changes in value, but balance sheet losses cannot be offset against them. Losses are carried forward and later reduced by profits.
Anyone who argues that „gold profits“ could simply be used is mixing balance sheet logic with liquidity. The balance sheet says: value is there. The budget asks: where is the cash?
The mechanism is less spectacular than the headlines: On the asset side are holdings from the monetary policy phase with low-interest bonds. On the liability side are higher-interest deposits.
The Bundesbank quantifies this very specifically for 2025: The interest rate on monetary policy securities averaged 0.58%, while the interest burden from monetary policy deposits of credit institutions was 2.31%.
The result is a negative interest margin – and that is exactly what gives rise to the loss years.
Into this situation falls the proposal by DIW President Marcel Fratzscher to sell parts of Germany's gold reserves to finance investments. In the public debate, the current value of the holdings is often cited: „just under 440 billion euros“.
The idea seems pragmatic at first glance: high gold price, tight budgets – why not reallocate? The error lies in the detail: For central banks, gold is not just an „investment,“ but also a balance sheet anchor and a reserve of confidence. This is precisely why the proposal is rejected by the Bundesbank and numerous economists.
Anyone who sells gold reduces the item that feeds the revaluation reserve. In an environment where the Bundesbank carries forward balance sheet losses, this is more than a portfolio question. It is a question of the robustness of its own „buffer“ in the perception of markets and the public.
In addition: Gold is attractive in the central bank context precisely because it does not correspond to any single debtor risk. In a world where geopolitical tensions are increasing and trust quickly becomes a scarce resource, this is a structural advantage – not just a price argument.
According to the Bundesbank, Germany has around 3,384 tonnes of gold, making it the second-largest state-owned gold holding in the world.
This shows: we are not talking about a marginal position, but about a central component of the foreign exchange reserves.
The discussion becomes more understandable when the balance sheet logic is brought to one page.
| Key Figure (Bundesbank) | Value / Status |
|---|---|
| Gold position on the balance sheet | €395 billion (Dec 31, 2025) |
| Gold revaluation reserve | €387 billion (Dec 31, 2025) |
| Total revaluation account | €388 billion (Dec 31, 2025) |
| Annual deficit 2025 | €8.6 billion |
| Total accumulated loss | €27.8 billion |
| Net equity | €363 billion |
The proposal to sell gold sounds like a shortcut. In terms of balance sheet technology, it is more of an exchange: short-term proceeds for long-term robustness. And as long as revaluation reserves cannot „simply“ be translated into profits or budget funds, the crucial question remains: Do we really want to reduce the very item that visibly stabilizes confidence in the balance sheet architecture during loss-making years?
Especially in phases of interest rate reversals, geopolitical uncertainty, and high public spending debates, this is a decision that has not only economic but also institutional impact.
Stay farsighted, Yours Helge Peter Ippensen